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Abstract
We consider the stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problem (SGNEP)
with expected-value cost functions. Inspired by Yi and Pavel (Automat-
ica, 2019), we propose a distributed GNE seeking algorithm based on the
preconditioned forward–backward operator splitting for SGNEP, where,
at each iteration, the expected value of the pseudogradient is approxi-
mated via a number of random samples.
As main contribution, we show almost sure convergence of our pro-
posed algorithm if the pseudogradient mapping is restricted (monotone
and) cocoercive. For non–generalized SNEPs, we show almost sure con-
vergence also if the pseudogradient mapping is restricted strictly mono-
tone.
Numerical simulations show that the proposed forward–backward al-
gorithm seems faster that other available algorithms.
Keywords. Stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problems, stochastic vari-
ational inequalities.
1 Introduction
Nash equilibrium problems (NEPs) have been widely studied since their first
formulation [1]. In a NEP, a set of agents interacts with the aim of minimizing
their cost functions. A number of results are present concerning existence ad
uniqueness of an equilibrium as well as methodologies to compute one [2, 3].
The interactions between the agents are expressed, in this case, only through
the cost function. For the sake of generality and of making the problem realistic,
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coupling constraints have been considered as well, since the introduction of so-
called generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs) [4]. This class of games
has been recently studied by the multi-agent system and control community [5,
6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. One main reason for this interest is related to possible applications
that range from economics, to engineering and operation research [6, 11].
The characteristic of GNEPs is that each agent seeks to minimize his own
cost function under some joint feasibility constraints. Namely, both the cost
function and the constraints depend on the strategies chosen by the other agents.
Consequently, the search for GNE is usually very difficult.
Similarly to NEPs, a number of results are present concerning algorithms
and methodologies to find an equilibrium in a GNEP [12, 13]. In the determin-
istic case, many algorithm are available to find a solution, both distributed or
semi-decentralized [5, 14, 15]. Among the possible methods to reach an equilib-
rium, an elegant approach is to seek for a solution of the associated variational
inequality (VI) [13].
To recast the problem as a VI, the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions
are considered and the problem is rewritten as a monotone inclusion. Such a
problem can then be solved via operator splitting techniques. Among others, we
focus on the forward–backward (FB) splitting which leads to one of the fastest
and definitely simplest algorithm available [16].
The downside of the FB scheme is that, when applied to GNEPs, it is not
distributed. When considering game-theoretic setup, it is desirable (and more
realistic) to consider distributed algorithms, in the sense that each agent should
only know its local cost function and its local constraints. For this reason,
preconditioning has been recently introduced in [5]. In [17], we propose a pre-
liminary extension of this method to the stochastic case.
A stochastic NEP (SNEP) is a NEP where the cost functions are expected
value functions. Such problems arise when there is some uncertainty, expressed
through a random variable with an unknown distribution. Unfortunately, SNEPs
are not studied as much as their deterministic counterpart, despite a number of
practical problems must be modelled with uncertainty. Among others, in trans-
portation systems, a possible source of uncertainty is the drivers perception of
travel time [18]; in electricity markets, companies produce energy without know-
ing in advance exactly the demand [19]. Similarly to the deterministic case, if
we also consider shared constraints, the problem can be modelled with stochas-
tic GNEPs (SGNEPs) [20]. For instance, any networked Cournot games with
market capacity constraints, with uncertainty in the demand, can be modelled
in this case [21, 22]. Due to their wide applicability, SGNEPs have received
quite some attention from the control community as well [23, 24, 25].
A SGNEP is a GNEP with expected value cost functions. Indeed, if the
random variable is known, the expected value formulation can be solved with
any standard technique for deterministic variational inequalities. However, the
pseudogradient is usually not directly accessible, for instance due to the need
of excessive computations in performing the expected value. For this reason, in
many situations, the search for a solution of a SVI relies on samples of the ran-
dom variable. Essentially, there are two main methodologies available: sample
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average approximation (SAA) and stochastic approximation (SA). In the SAA
approach, we replace the expected value formulation with the average over an
increasing number of samples of the random variable. This approach is prac-
tical when there is a huge number of data available as, for instance, in Monte
Carlo simulations or machine learning [26, 27]. In the SA approach, each agent
can sample only one realization of the random variable. This approach is less
computationally expensive, but, not surprisingly, it usually requires stronger
assumptions on the mappings involved [24, 28, 29].
One of the very first formulations of a SA approach for a stochastic FB
problem was made in [30], under the assumption of strong monotonicity and
Lipschitz continuity of the mapping involved. In [31] instead, convergence is
proved under cocoercivity and uniform monotonicity. To weaken the assump-
tions, algorithms more involved than the FB have been proposed and studied
in the literature. For instance, in a recent paper, [26], the authors propose a
forward-backward-forward (FBF) algorithm that converges to a solution under
the assumption of pseudomonotone pseudo-gradient mapping but it requires
two costly evaluations of the pseudogradient mapping. Alternatively, under the
same assumptions, one can consider the extragradient (EG) method proposed
in [27] which takes two projection steps that can be slow. Therefore, taking
weaker assumptions comes at the price of having computational complexity and
slowness of the algorithms.
In this paper, we present a FB algorithm and prove its convergence both for
SGNEPs and SNEPs. In particular, our main contributions are the following:
• We present the first preconditioned FB algorithm for SGNEPs with non
smooth cost functions and prove its almost sure convergence to an equi-
librium.
• Almost sure convergence is shown under restricted cocoercivity of the
pseudo-gradient mapping by using the SAA scheme (Sections 4 and 5).
• For SNEPs, the FB algorithm converge almost surely under restricted
cocoercivity or restricted strict monotonicity also with the SA scheme
(Section 6).
Our assumptions are weaker when compared to the current literature on FB
algorithms. Indeed, the preconditioning technique is presented in [5, 14] under
strong monotonicity while FB algorithms for stochastic VIs converge almost
surely for cocoercive and uniformly monotone [31] or strongly monotone oper-
ators [30, 32]. Moreover, compared to the naively monotone FBF and EG, our
algorithm shows faster convergence both in number of iterations and computa-
tional time.
We point out that, in both cases, we suppose the pseudogradient to be
Lipschitz continuous, but knowing the Lipschitz constant is not necessary. This
is remarkable since computing the Lipschitz constant can be challenging in a
distributed setup.
A preliminary study related to this work is submitted for publication [17]. In
that paper, we considered a SGNEP and build a preconditioned FB algorithm
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with damping. The algorithm is guaranteed to reach a SGNE if the pseudogra-
dient mapping is strongly monotone and its convergence follows directly from
[31]. We here motivate in details that the assumption of uniform monotonicity
taken in [31] can be replaced with assumptions related to specific properties of
the selected approximation schemes. Moreover, restricted cocoercivity is enough
for the analysis and to ensure convergence.
2 Notation and preliminaries
We use Standing Assumptions to postulate technical conditions that implic-
itly hold throughout the paper while Assumptions are postulated only when
explicitly called.
R denotes the set of real numbers and R¯ = R ∪ {+∞}. 〈·, ·〉 : Rn × Rn → R
denotes the standard inner product and ‖·‖ represents the associated Euclidean
norm. We indicate a (symmetric and) positive definite matrix A, i.e., x⊤Ax > 0,
with A ≻ 0. Given a matrix Φ ≻ 0, we denote the Φ-induced inner product,
〈x, y〉Φ = 〈Φx, y〉. The associated Φ-induced norm, ‖·‖Φ, is defined as ‖x‖Φ =√〈Φx, x〉. A ⊗ B indicates the Kronecker product between matrices A and
B. 0m indicates the vector with m entries all equal to 0. Given N vectors
x1, . . . , xN ∈ Rn, x := col (x1, . . . , xN ) =
[
x⊤1 , . . . , x
⊤
N
]⊤
.
JF = (Id+F )
−1 is the resolvent of the operator F : Rn → Rn where Id
indicates the identity operator. The set of fixed points of F is fix(F ) := {x ∈
Rn | x ∈ F (x)}. For a closed set C ⊆ Rn, the mapping projC : Rn → C denotes
the projection onto C, i.e., projC(x) = argminy∈C ‖y−x‖. The residual mapping
is, in general, defined as res(xk) =
∥∥xk − projC(xk − F (xk))∥∥ . Given a proper,
lower semi-continuous, convex function g, the subdifferential is the operator
∂g(x) := {u ∈ Ω | (∀y ∈ Ω) : 〈y − x, u〉+ g(x) ≤ g(y)}. The proximal operator
is defined as proxg(v) := argminu∈Ω{g(u) + 12 ‖u− v‖2} = J∂g(v). ιC is the
indicator function of the set C, i.e., ιC(x) = 1 if x ∈ C and ιC(x) = 0 otherwise.
The set-valued mapping NC : R
n → Rn denotes the normal cone operator for the
the set C , i.e., NC(x) = ∅ if x /∈ C,
{
v ∈ Rn| supz∈C v⊤(z − x) ≤ 0
}
otherwise.
We now recall some basic properties of operators [13]. First, we recall that
F is ℓ-Lipschitz continuous if, for some ℓ > 0
‖F (x)− F (y)‖ ≤ ℓ ‖x− y‖ for all x, y ∈ Rn.
Definition 1 (Monotone operators). A mapping F : domF ⊆ Rn → Rn is:
• (strictly) monotone if for all x, y ∈ dom(F ) (x 6= y)
〈F (x)− F (y), x− y〉 ≥ (>) 0;
• β-cocoercive with β > 0, if for all x, y ∈ dom(F )
〈F (x) − F (y), x− y〉 ≥ β‖F (x)− F (y)‖2;
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• firmly non expansive if for all x, y ∈ dom(F )
‖F (x)− F (y)‖2 ≤ ‖x− y‖2 − ‖(Id− F )(x) − (Id− F )(y)‖2.
We use the adjective “restricted” if a property holds for all (x, y) ∈ dom(F ) ×
fix(F ). 
An example of firmly non expansive operator is the projection operator over a
nonempty, compact and convex set [16, Proposition 4.16]. We note that a firmly
non expansive operator is also cocoercive, hence monotone and non expansive
[16, Definition 4.1].
3 Mathematical background: Generalized Nash
equilibrium problems
We consider a set I = {1, . . . , N} of noncooperative agents, each of them choos-
ing its strategy xi ∈ Rni from its local decision set Ωi ⊆ Rni . The aim of
each agent is to minimize its local cost function within its feasible strategy set.
We call x−i = col({xj}j 6=i) the decisions of all the agents with the exception
of i and set n =
∑N
i=1 ni. The local cost function of agent i is a function
Ji(xi,x−i) : R
ni × Rn−ni → R that depends on both the local variable xi and
the decision of the other agents x−i. The cost function has the form
Ji(xi,x−i) := fi(xi,x−i) + gi(xi), (1)
that present the typical splitting in smooth and non smooth parts. We assume
that the non smooth part is represented by gi : R
ni → R¯. We note that it can
model not only a local cost, but also local constraints via an indicator function,
e.g. gi(xi) = ιΩi(xi).
Standing Assumption 1 (Local cost). For each i ∈ I, the function gi in (1)
is lower semicontinuous and convex and dom(gi) = Ωi is nonempty, compact
and convex. 
Standing Assumption 2 (Cost functions convexity). For each i ∈ I and
x−i ∈ X−i the function fi(·,x−i) is convex and continuously differentiable. 
Furthermore, we consider a game with affine shared constraints Ax ≤ b.
Therefore, the feasible decision set of each agent i ∈ I is denoted by the set-
valued mapping Xi,:
Xi(x−i) :=
{
yi ∈ Ωi | Aiyi ≤ b−
∑N
j 6=iAjxj
}
, (2)
where Ai ∈ Rm×n and b ∈ Rm. The set Ωi represents the local decision set
for agent i, while the matrix Ai defines how agent i is involved in the coupling
constraints. The collective feasible set can be written as
X = {y ∈ Ω | Ay − b ≤ 0m} (3)
where Ω =
∏N
i=1Ωi and A = [A1, . . . , AN ] ∈ Rm×n.
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Standing Assumption 3 (Constraints qualification). The set X satisfies Slater’s
constraint qualification. 
The aim of each agent i, given the decision variables of the other agents x−i,
is to choose a strategy xi, that solves its local optimization problem, i.e.,
∀i ∈ I :
{
min
xi∈Ωi
Ji (xi,x−i)
s.t. Aixi ≤ b−
∑N
j 6=iAjxj .
(4)
When the optimization problems are simultaneously solved, the solution concept
that we are seeking is that of generalized Nash equilibrium.
Definition 2. A Generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) is a collective strategy
x∗ ∈ X such that, for all i ∈ I,
Ji(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≤ inf{Ji(y,x∗−i) | y ∈ Xi(x−i)}. 
In other words, a GNE is a set of strategies where no agent can decrease
its objective function by unilaterally deviating from its decision. While, under
Assumptions 1–3, existence of GNE of the game is guaranteed by [12, Section
4.1], uniqueness does not hold in general [12, Section 4.3].
Within all the possible Nash equilibria, we focus on those that corresponds
to the solution set of an appropriate variational inequality. To this aim, let the
(pseudo) gradient of the cost function be
F (x) = col (∇x1f1 (x1,x−1) , . . . ,∇xN fN (xN ,x−N )) , (5)
and let
G(x) = col(∂g1(x1), . . . , ∂gN(xN )). (6)
Formally, the variational inequality problem, VI(X , F,G), is [16, Definition
26.19]: find x∗ ∈ X such that
〈F (x∗),x− x∗〉+G(x)−G(x∗) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X . (7)
Remark 1. Under Standing Assumptions 1–3, the solution set of VI(X , F,G)
is non empty and compact, i.e. SOL(X , F,G) 6= ∅ [13, Corollary 2.2.5].
When Standing Assumptions 1–3 hold, any solution of VI(X , F,G) in (7) is
a GNE of the game in (4), while vice versa does not hold in general. Indeed,
there may be Nash equilibria that are not solution of the VI [33, Proposition
12.7]. The GNE that are also solution of the associated VI are called variational
equilibria (v-GNE).
The GNEP can be recasted as a monotone inclusion, namely, the problem of
finding a zero of a set-valued monotone operator. To this aim, we characterize a
GNE of the game in terms of the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions of the
coupled optimization problems in (4). Then, the set of strategies x∗ is a GNE
if and only if the corresponding KKT conditions are satisfied [12, Theorem 4.6].
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Moreover, since the variational problem is a minimization problem, appropriate
KKT conditions hold also in this case. The interest in such conditions is due to
[34, Theorem 3.1] that provides a criteria to select GNE that are also solution of
the VI. Specifically, under assumptions 1–3, [34, Theorem 3.1] establishes that
the equilibrium points are those such that the shared constraints have the same
dual variable for all the agents. We refer also to [35, Theorem 3.1] for a more
general result.
Remark 2. For non-generalized Nash equilibrium problems, being a solution
of the VI is necessary and sufficient to be a Nash equilibrium. Formally, a
collective strategy x∗ ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium of the game if and only if x∗
satisfies (7) [13, Proposition 1.4.2]. 
In [5], the authors propose a distributed preconditioned FB algorithm as
in Algorithm 1. Inspired by this work, in the following sections we describe
SGNEPs and propose the stochastic counterpart of Algorithm 1 (Algorithm 2).
Therefore, more details on the preconditioning procedure and on how to obtain
the algorithm are described in Section 4.2.
Remark 3. When the local cost function is the indicator function, we can use
the projection on the local feasible set Ωi, instead of the proximal operator [16,
Example 12.25]. 
Algorithm 1 Preconditioned Forward Backward [5]
Initialization: x0i ∈ Ωi, λ0i ∈ Rm≥0, and z0i ∈ Rm.
Iteration k: Agent i
(1) Receives xkj for j ∈ N Ji , λkj for j ∈ N λi , then updates
xk+1i = proxgi [x
k
i − αi(∇xiJi(xki ,xk−i)−A⊤i λki )]
zk+1i = z
k
i − νi
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j(λ
k
i − λkj )
(2) Receives zj,k+1 for j ∈ N λi , then updates
λk+1i =projRm≥0
{λki − σi[Ai(2xk+1i − xki )− bi
+ σi
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j [2(z
k+1
i − zj,k+1)− (zki − zkj )]
+ σi
∑
j∈Nλi
wi,j(λ
k
i − λkj )]}
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4 Stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium prob-
lems
4.1 Stochastic equilibrium problem formulation
In this section we describe the stochastic counterpart of GNEPs (SGNEPs).
With SGNEP we mean a GNEP where the cost function is an expected value
function. As in the deterministic case, we consider a set of agents I = {1, . . . , N}
with strategies xi ∈ Ωi ⊆ Rni . Each of the agents seek to minimize its local cost
function within its feasible strategy set Ωi that satisfy Standing Assumption 1.
The local cost function of agent i is defined as
Ji(xi,x−i) := Eξ[fi(xi,x−i, ξ(ω))] + gi(xi). (8)
for some measurable function fi : R
n×Rd → R. We suppose that the cost func-
tions in (8) satisfy Standing Assumptions 1 and 2. The uncertainty is expressed
through the random variable ξ : Ξ → Rd where (Ξ,F ,P) is the probability
space. The cost function depends on both the local variable xi, the decision of
the other agents x−i and on the random variable ξ. Eξ represent the mathemat-
ical expectation with respect to the distribution of the random variable ξ(ω)1.
We assume that E[fi(x, ξ)] is well defined for all the feasible x ∈ X .
Since we consider a SGNEP, the feasible decision set of each agent i ∈ I is
denoted by the set-valued mapping Xi as in (2) and the collective feasible set
is X as in (3). We suppose that there is no uncertainty in the constraints and
that Assumption 1 and 3 are satisfied.
The aim of each agent i, given the decision variables of the other agents x−i,
is to choose a strategy xi, that solves its local optimization problem, i.e.,
∀i ∈ I :
{
min
xi∈Ωi
Ji (xi,x−i)
s.t. Aixi ≤ b−
∑N
j 6=iAjxj .
(9)
We aim to compute a stochastic Generalized Nash equilibrium (SGNE) as in
Definition 2 but with expected value cost functions, that is, a collective strategy
x∗ ∈ X such that for all i ∈ I
Ji(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≤ inf{Ji(y,x∗−i) | y ∈ Xi(x∗−i)}. (10)
To guarantee the existence of a SGNE, we make further assumptions on the
cost function.
Standing Assumption 4 (Cost functions measurability). For each i ∈ I and
for each ξ ∈ Ξ, the function fi(·,x−i, ξ) is convex, Lipschitz continuous, and
continuously differentiable. The function fi(xi,x−i, ·) is measurable and for
each x−i, the Lipschitz constant ℓi(x−i, ξ) is integrable in ξ. 
1From now on, we use ξ instead of ξ(ω) and E instead of Eξ.
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While, under Standing Assumptions 1–4, existence of SGNE of the game is
guaranteed by [23, Section 3.1], uniqueness does not hold in general [23, Section
3.2].
As for the deterministic case we seek for a v-GNE, we here study the asso-
ciated stochastic variational inequality (SVI). The (pseudo) gradient mapping
is given, in this case, by
F(x) = col ((E[∇xifi(xi,x−i, ξ)])i∈I) . (11)
The possibility to exchange the expected value and the gradient is guaranteed
by Standing Assumption 4. The associated SVI reads as
〈F(x∗),x− x∗〉+G(x)−G(x∗) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X (12)
where G is defined as in (6).
The stochastic v-GNE (v-SGNE) of the game in (9) is defined as the solution
of the SVI(X ,F, G) in (12) where F is described in (11) and X is defined in (3).
In what follows, we recast the SGNEP into a monotone inclusion. For each
agent i ∈ N, the Lagrangian function Li is defined as
Li (x, λi) := Ji (xi,x−i) + gi (xi) + λ⊤i (Ax− b)
where λi ∈ Rm≥0 is the Lagrangian dual variable associated with the coupling
constraints. The set of strategies x∗ is a SGNE if and only if the following KKT
conditions are satisfied:{
0 ∈ E[∇xifi(x∗i ,x∗−i, ξ)] + ∂gi (x∗i ) +A⊤i λi
0 ∈ (Ax∗ − b) + NRm
≥0
(λ∗).
(13)
Similarly, we can use the KKT conditions to characterize the variational
problem, studying the Lagrangian function associated to the SVI. Since x∗ is a
solution of SVI(X ,F, G) if and only if
x∗ ∈ argmin
y∈X
(y − x∗)⊤ F (x∗) ,
the associated KKT optimality conditions reads as
∀i ∈ I :
{
0 ∈ E[∇xifi(x∗i ,x∗−i, ξ)] + ∂gi (x∗i ) +A⊤i λ,
0 ∈ (Ax∗ − b) + NRm
≥0
(λ∗).
(14)
As exploited by [34, Theorem 3.1], [35, Theorem 3.1], we seek for a v-SGNE,
that is, an equilibrium that reach consensus of the dual variables.
4.2 Stochastic preconditioned forward-backward algorithm
We now describe the details of the preconditioning procedure that leads to the
distributed iterations presented in Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2 Preconditioned Stochastic Forward–Backward
Initialization: x0i ∈ Ωi, λ0i ∈ Rm≥0, and z0i ∈ Rm.
Iteration k: Agent i
(1): Receives xkj for all j ∈ N hi , λkj for j ∈ N λi then updates:
xk+1i = proxgi [x
k
i − αi(Fˆi(xki ,xk−i, ξki )−A⊤i λki )]
zk+1i = z
k
i − νi
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j(λ
k
i − λkj )
(2): Receives zj,k+1 for all j ∈ N λi then updates:
λk+1i = projRm+
[
λki + σi
(
Ai(2x
k+1
i − xki )− bi
)
+ σi
∑
j∈Nλi
wi,j
(
2(zk+1i − zk+1j )− (zki − zkj )
)
− σi
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j(λ
k
i − λkj )
]
We suppose that each agent i only knows its local data, i.e., Ωi, Ai and
bi. Moreover, each player has access to a pool of samples of the random
variable and is able to compute, given the actions of the other players x−i,
E[∇xifi(xi,x−i, ξ)] (or an approximation, as exploited later in this section).
Since the cost function is affected by the other agents strategies, we call
N fi the set of agents j interacting with i. Specifically, j ∈ N fi if the function
fi(xi,x−i) explicitly depends on xj .
A local copy of the dual variable is shared through the dual variables graph,
Gλ = (I, Eλ). Along with the dual variable, agents share on Gλ a copy of
the auxiliary variable zi ∈ Rm. The role of z = col(z1, . . . , zN ) is to force
consensus, since this is the configuration that we are seeking. A deeper insight
on this variable is given later in this section. The set of edges Eλ is given by:
(i, j) ∈ Eλ if player i can receive {λj , zj} from player j. The neighbouring agents
in Gλ forms a set N λi = {j ∈ I : (i, j) ∈ Eλ} for all i ∈ I. In this way, each
agent control his own decision variable, a local copy of the dual variable λi and
of the auxiliary variable zi and has access to the other agents variables through
the graphs.
Standing Assumption 5 (Graph connectivity). The dual-variable graph Gλ
is undirected and connected. 
We call W ∈ RN×N the weighted adjacency matrix of Gλ. Then, letting
di =
∑N
j=1 wi,j and D = diag{d1, . . . , dN}, the associated Laplacian is the
matrix L = D − W . Moreover, it follows from Standing Assumption 5 that
L = L⊤. Assumption 5 is important to reach consensus of the dual variables.
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Rewriting the KKT conditions in (14) in compact form as
0 ∈ T (x,λ) :=
[
G(x) + F(x) +A⊤λ
NRm
≥0
(λ)− (Ax− b)
]
(15)
where T : X × Rm≥0 ⇒ Rn × Rm is a set-valued mapping, it follows that the
v-SGNE correspond to the zeros of the mapping T .
In the remaining part of this section, we split T into the summation of
two operators A and B that satisfy specific properties. The advantage of this
technique is that the zeros of the mapping A+ B correspond to the fixed point
of a specific operator depending on both A and B, as exploited in [14, 5]. Such a
scheme is known as forward backward (FB) splitting [16, Section 26.5]. Indeed,
it holds that, for any matrix Φ ≻ 0, ω ∈ zer(A+ B) if and only if,
ω = (Id + Φ−1B)−1 ◦ (Id− Φ−1A)(ω).
Specifically, the operator T can be written as a summation of the two oper-
ators
A :
[
x
λ
]
7→
[
F(x)
b
]
B :
[
x
λ
]
7→
[
G(x)
NRm
≥0
(λ)
]
+
[
0 A⊤
−A 0
] [
x
λ
]
.
(16)
Therefore, finding a solution of the variational SGNEP translates in finding
a pair (x∗,λ∗) ∈ X × Rm≥0 such that (x∗,λ∗) ∈ zer(A+ B).
To impose consensus on the dual variables, the authors in [5] proposed the
Laplacian constraint Lλ = 0. This is why, to preserve monotonicity we expand
the two operators A and B in (16) introducing the auxiliary variable z ∈ RNm.
Let L ∈ RN×N be the laplacian of Gλ and set L = L ⊗ Idm ∈ RNm×Nm. Let
us define A = diag{A1, . . . , AN} ∈ RNm×n and λ = col(λ1, . . . , λN ) ∈ RNm;
similarly we define b of suitable dimensions. Then, let us define
A¯ :

 xz
λ

 7→

 F(x)0
b

+

 00
Lλ


B¯ :

 xz
λ

 7→

 G(x)0
NRm
≥0
(λ)

+

 0 0 A⊤0 0 L
−A −L 0



 xz
λ

 .
(17)
To ensure that the zeros of A¯+ B¯ correspond to the zeros of the operator T
in (15), we take the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (Restricted cocoercivity). F is restricted β-cocoercive, with β >
0. 
Then, the following result holds.
Lemma 1. Let Assumption 1 hold and consider the operators A¯ and B¯ in (17),
and the operators A and B in (16). Then the following hold.
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(i) Given any ω∗ ∈ zer(A¯+ B¯), x∗ is a v-GNE of game in (4), i.e., x∗ solves
the VI(X ,F, G) in (7). Moreover λ∗ = 1N ⊗ λ∗, and (x∗, λ∗) satisfy the
KKT condition in (14) i.e., col(x∗, λ∗) ∈ zer(A+ B);
(ii) zer(A+ B) 6= ∅ and zer(A¯+ B¯) 6= ∅.
Proof. See Appendix 10.
The two operators A¯ and B¯ in (17) have the following properties.
Lemma 2. Let Assumption 1 hold and let Φ ≻ 0. The operators A¯ and B¯ in
(17) have the following properties:
(i) A¯ is θ-cocoercive where 0 < θ ≤ min{ 12d∗ , β} and d∗ is the maximum
weighted degree of Gλ;
(ii) The operator B¯ is maximally monotone;
(iii) Φ−1A¯ is θγ-cocoercive where γ = 1|Φ−1| ;
(iv) Φ−1B¯ is maximally monotone.
Proof. See Appendix 10.
Since the expected value can be hard to compute, as the distribution of the
random variable is unknown, we take an approximation of the pseudogradient.
At this stage, it is not important which type of approximation we use, therefore,
in what follows, we replace A¯ with
Aˆ :

 (x, ξ)z
λ

 7→

 Fˆ (x, ξ)0
b

+

 00
Lλ

 (18)
where Fˆ is an approximation of the expected value mapping F in (11) given
some realization of the random vector ξ.
The fixed point problem, given Φ ≻ 0, now reads as
ω = (Id+Φ−1B¯)−1 ◦ (Id−Φ−1Aˆ)(ω) (19)
and suggests the stochastic FB algorithm
ωk+1 = (Id + Φ−1B)−1 ◦ (Id− Φ−1Aˆ)(ωk, ξk). (20)
where (Id+Φ−1B¯)−1 represent the backward step and (Id−Φ−1A¯) is the forward
step.
By expanding (20), we obtain the distributed FB steps in Algorithm 2 with
Aˆ as in (18), B¯ as in (17) and
Φ =

 α−1 0 −A⊤0 ν−1 −L
−A −L σ−1

 . (21)
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α−1 = diag{α−11 In1 , . . . , α−1N InN} ∈ Rn×n and similarly we define σ−1 and ν−1
of suitable dimensions. We note that Φ is symmetric and such that ωk is easy to
be computed and the iterations are sequential [14]. If we use the traditional FB
algorithm with Φ = Id, we have to compute the resolvent of B¯ that involves the
constraint matrix A and the Laplacian L, therefore, it could not be evaluated
in a distributed way. With Φ as in (29), we overcome this problem [5].
5 Convergence analysis with sample average ap-
proximation
We here state some sufficient assumptions for the convergence of Algorithm 2
to a v-SGNE. Note that Algorithm 2 involves an approximation of F but it does
not specify which one. Indeed, preconditioning can be done independently of
the approximation scheme. Concerning the convergence analysis, however, we
consider the sample average approximation (SAA) scheme.
We assume the decision maker to have access to an increasing number Sk of
samples of the random variable ξ and to be able to compute an approximation
of F(x) of the form
Fˆ (x, ξ) = FSAA(x, ξ)
= col
(
1
Sk
Sk∑
t=1
∇x1f1(x, ξ(t)1 ), . . . ,
1
S
Sk∑
t=1
∇xN fN(x, ξ(t)N )
)
.
(22)
where ξ = col(ξ¯1, . . . , ξ¯n), for all i ∈ I, ξ¯i = col(ξ(1)i , . . . , ξ(Sk)i ) and ξ is an i.i.d.
sequence of random variables drawn from P.
Approximations of the form (22) are very common in Monte-Carlo simulation
approaches, machine learning and computational statistics [26].
For k ≥ 0, let us introduce the approximation error
ǫk = FSAA(x
k, ξk)− F(xk). (23)
Remark 4. Since there is no uncertainty in the constraints
ASAA(ωk, ξk)−A(ωk) = εk,
where ASAA is the operator Aˆ with approximation FSAA as in (22) and εk =
col(ǫk, 0, 0). 
The following assumption is widely used in the stochastic framework [24, 27].
Standing Assumption 6 (Zero mean error). For al k ≥ 0,
E [ǫk|Fk] = 0 a. s. 
To guarantee that Φ is positive definite and to obtain convergence, the step
size sequence can be taken constant but it should satisfy some bounds [5, Lemma
6].
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Assumption 2 (Bounded step sizes). The step size sequence is such that, given
γ > 0, for every agent i ∈ I
0 < αi ≤
(
γ + max
j∈{1,...,ni}
∑m
k=1
|[A⊤i ]jk|
)−1
0 < νi ≤ (γ + 2di)−1
0 < σi ≤
(
γ + 2di + max
j∈{1,...,m}
∑ni
k=1
|[Ai]jk|
)−1
where [A⊤i ]jk indicates the entry (j, k) of the matrix A
⊤
i . Moreover,∥∥Φ−1∥∥ < 2θ,
where θ is the cocoercivity constant of A¯ as in Lemma 2. 
The number of samples to be taken for the SAA must satisfy some conditions
as well.
Assumption 3 (Increasing batch size). The batch size sequence (Sk)k≥1 is such
that, for some c, k0, a > 0,
Sk ≥ c(k + k0)a+1. 
This assumption implies that 1/Sk is summable, which is a standard as-
sumption in SAA schemes. It is often used in combination with the forthcoming
variance reduction assumption to control the stochastic error [26, 27].
Assumption 4 (Variance reduction). There exist p ≥ 2, σ1 ≥ 0, and a
measurable locally bounded function σ : SOL(X ,F, G) → R such that for all
(x,x∗) ∈ Rn × SOL(X ,F, G)
E [‖FSAA(x, ·)− F(x)‖p]
1
p ≤ σ (x∗) + σ1 ‖x− x∗‖ . (24)

Remark 5. For simplicity of presentation, let us consider a stronger assump-
tion instead of (24), namely, for all x ∈ X
E
[
‖FSAA(x, ·)− F(x)‖2
]
≤ σ2 (25)
for some σ > 0. In the literature, (25) is known as uniform bounded variance.
Assumption 4 is more natural when the feasible set is unbounded and it is always
satisfied when mapping F is Caratheodory and Lipschitz continuous [26, Ex.
3.1]. Since we are in a game theoretic setup, our feasible set is bounded, we can
to use (25) as a variance control assumption.
We also remark that all the following results hold also in the more general
case given by Assumption 4 and using the Lp norm for any p ≥ 2. We refer to
[26, 27] for a more detailed insight on this general case. 
14
We are now ready to state the convergence result for the SAA case.
Theorem 1. Let Assumptions 1–4 hold. Then the sequence (xk)k∈N generated
by Algorithm 2 with approximation Fˆ = FSAA as in (22) converges a.s. to a
v-SGNE of the game in (9).
Proof. See Appendix 12.
6 Stochastic Nash equilibrium problem
6.1 Stochastic Nash equilibrium recap
In this section we consider a SNEP, that is, a SGNEP with expected value cost
functions but without shared constraints.
We consider a set I = {1, . . . , N} of noncooperative agents choosing their
strategy xi ∈ Rni from its local decision set Ωi which satisfy Standing Assump-
tion 1. The local cost function of agent i is defined as in (8).
Standing Assumptions 1, 2 and 4 hold also in this case. The aim of each
agent i, given the decision variables of the other agents x−i, is to choose a
strategy xi, that solves its local optimization problem, i.e.,
∀i ∈ I : min
xi∈Ωi
Ji (xi,x−i) . (26)
As a solution, we aim to compute a stochastic Nash equilibrium (SNE), that is,
a collective strategy x∗ ∈ Ω such that for all i ∈ I
Ji(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) ≤ inf{Ji(y,x∗−i) | y ∈ Ωi)}.
We note that, compared to Definition 2 and Equation (10), here we consider
only local constraints.
Also in this case, we study the associated stochastic variational inequality
(SVI) given by
〈F(x∗),x− x∗〉+G(x)−G(x∗) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ Ω (27)
where F is defined in (11) and G as in (6). As mentioned in Remark 2, being a
NE is necessary and sufficient for being a solution of the VI(Ω,F, G).
The stochastic variational equilibrium (v-SNE) of game (26) is defined as the
solution of the SVI(Ω,F, G) in (12) where F is described in (11). The distributed
FB algorithm that we propose is presented in Algorithm 3.
6.2 Convergence for restricted cocoercive pseudogradients
If the restricted cocoercivity assumption holds for the pseudogradient (Assump-
tion 1) and there are enough sample available, one can use Algorithm 2 with
A = 0, b = 0 and the SAA scheme as in (22). Moreover in this case, it is possible
to use also the stochastic approximation scheme.
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Algorithm 3 Distributed Stochastic Forward–Backward
Initialization: x0i ∈ Ωi
Iteration k: Agent i receives xkj for all j ∈ N hi , then updates:
xki = proxgi [x
k
i − αiFˆi(xki ,xk−i, ξki )]
In this case, we approximate F with only one realization of the random
variable ξ, therefore, the approximation Fˆ is formally defined as
Fˆ (xk, ξk) = FSA(x
k, ξk)
= col
(∇x1f1(xk, ξk1 ), . . . ,∇xN fN (xk, ξkN )) , (28)
where ξk = col(ξk1 , . . . , ξ
k
N ) ∈ RN is a collection of i.i.d. random variables drawn
from P.
Before stating the convergence result, we state some further assumptions.
With a little abuse of notation, the approximation error is defined as
ǫk = FSA(x
k, ξk)− F(xk).
We suppose that it satisfies Standing Assumption 6. Moreover, in the SA
scheme, there are assumptions also on the step size sequence. In particular,
here we let the sequence of the step sizes to be diminishing. This assumption
is standard in literature and it has the role of controlling the stochastic error
[24, 36].
Assumption 5 (Vanishing step sizes). The step size sequence (γk)k∈N is such
that
∞∑
k=0
γk =∞,
∞∑
k=0
γ2k <∞ and
∞∑
k=0
γ2k E
[
‖ǫk‖2 |Fk
]
<∞.

Assumption 6 (Bounded step sizes). The step size sequence {γk} is such that
γk ≤ 2β where β is the cocoercivity constant of F as in Assumption 1. 
We can now state our convergence result.
Theorem 2. Let Assumptions 1, 5, 6 hold. The sequence (xk)k∈N generated
by Algorithm 3, with approximation Fˆ = FSA as in (28), converges a.s. to a
v-SNE of the game in (26).
Proof. See Appendix 13.
6.3 Convergence for restricted strictly monotone mappings
If Assumption 1 is replaced with restricted strict monotonicity, it is still possible
to prove convergence. Therefore, in the remaining part of this section we analyze
this case.
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Assumption 7. F is restricted strictly monotone at x∗ ∈ SOL(Ω,F, G). 
Under this assumption, if a solution exists [13, Corollary 2.2.5], then it is
unique [13, Theorem 2.3.3].
Remark 6. A cocoercive mapping is not necessarily strictly monotone and, vice
versa, a strictly monotone mapping is not necessarily cocoercive. 
For the sake of proving convergence, we suppose F to be restricted Lipschitz
continuous. On the other hand, we recall that it is not necessary to know the
value of the Lipschitz constant since it does not affect the parameters involved
in the algorithm. This is very practical, since in general the Lipschitz constant
is not easy to compute.
Assumption 8. F is restricted Lipschitz continuous at x∗ ∈ SOL(Ω,F, G). 
We can now state the convergence result.
Theorem 3. Let Assumptions 5, 7, 8 hold. The sequence (xk)k∈N generated by
Algorithm 3 with approximation Fˆ = FSA as in (28) converges a.s. to a v-SNE
of the game in (26).
Proof. It follows as the proof of [36, Proposition 1], by substituting the projec-
tion with the proximal operator.
Corollary 1. If Assumptions 5, 7, 8 hold. The sequence generated by Algorithm
3 with approximation Fˆ = FSAA as in (22) converges a.s. to a v-SNE of the
game in (26). 
Remark 7. Since we take a vanishing step size (Assumption 5), in the case
of Corollary 1, the batch size sequence should not be increasing, that is, we can
take a constant number of realizations at every iteration. 
7 An open problem
We now discuss the SGNEP using the stochastic approximation (SA) scheme.
The idea is to approximate F with only one realization of the random variable
ξ as in (28). To counterbalance that, it turns that we have to make some
further assumptions on F and to take a vanishing step size in order to obtain
convergence.
In the case with SAA scheme (Section 5), one can rely on the huge number
of samples to obtain a good approximation of the expected value cost function.
When using SA instead, another way to control the error should be found. This
is why, usually, we choose a vanishing step size sequence, as in Assumption 5
[24, 30, 37].
Having time varying step size sequence formally translates into having, as a
preconditioning matrix,
Φk =

 α−1k 0 −A⊤0 ν−1 −L
−A −L σ−1

 , (29)
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that changes at every iteration. Therefore, a variable metric, induced by Φk
should be used for the convergence analysis. Such analysis is possible considering
the results in [5] and [38, 39]. In particular, the FB algorithm in this case reads
as
ωk+1 = (Id + Φ−1k B¯)−1 ◦ (Id− Φ−1k Aˆ)(ωk), (30)
while the sequence {Φk} should satisfy
sup
k∈N
‖Φ−1k ‖ <∞ and ∀k > 0 (1 + ηk)Φ−1k+1 < Φ−1k . (31)
Convergence of (30) in the deterministic case can be retrieved from [38, Theorem
4.1].
Even if αk is the only step which should be diminishing, (as in Remark 4, we
have the error only for the primal variable), the variable metric induced with
vanishing steps does not satisfy condition (31). Indeed, if Assumption 5 holds,∥∥Φ−1k+1∥∥ ≤ ∥∥Φ−1k ∥∥ and this contradicts condition (31). A possible interpretation
of why this condition is not satisfied is, loosely speaking, the following. Even
if numerically it is reasonable to have a vanishing step, theoretically, it is not
possible to prove if the algorithm converges to a zero of the mapping or to a zero
of the steps. However, our numerical experience suggests that the distributed
stochastic preconditioned FB algorithm may converge to a SGNE also with the
SA scheme (although very slowly). In light of this considerations, we state the
following conjecture.
Conjecture 1. Let Assumptions 1, 2, 5 hold. Then, the sequence generated by
Algorithm 2 with the approximation given in (28) converges to a v-SGNE of the
game in (9). 
In [38], the authors propose a deterministic FB algorithm with error and they
make the assumption of having a summable sequence of noises. This assumption
is not reasonable in the SA approach as in general the approximation error does
not vanish with time (this indeed holds in the SAA case, where the second
moment of stochastic error vanishes with 1/Sk, see Proposition 6). On the
other hand, if one has a vanishing stochastic error, the convergence analysis can
be done similarly to the SAA case.
8 Comparative numerical simulations
Let us propose a number of numerical simulations to corroborate the theoreti-
cal analysis where we also compare our algorithm with the forward-backward-
forward (FBF) and the extragradient (EG) algorithms.
8.1 Distributed forward-backward-forward and extragra-
dient
In this section, we describe the distributed FBF scheme, presented in Algorithm
4 [40] and the distributed EG scheme, in Algorithm 5.
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Algorithm 4 Stochastic Distributed Forward Backward Forward
Initialization: x0i ∈ Ωi, λ0i ∈ Rm≥0, and z0i ∈ Rm.
Iteration k: Agent i
(1) Receives xkj for j ∈ N Ji , λkj and zj,k for j ∈ N λi then updates
x˜ki = proxgi [x
k
i − αi(Fˆi(xki ,xk−i, ξki ) +A⊤i λki )]
z˜ki = z
k
i − νi
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j(λ
k
i − λkj )
λ˜ki = projRm
≥0
{λki + σi(Aixki − bi)
+ σi
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j [(z
k
i − zkj )− (λki − λkj )]}
(2) Receives x˜kj for j ∈ N Ji , λ˜kj and z˜j,k for j ∈ N λi then updates
xk+1i = x˜
k
i − αi(Fˆi(xki ,xk−i, ξki )− Fˆi(x˜ki , x˜k−i, ηki ))
− ρiA⊤i (λki − λ˜i,k)
zk+1i = z˜
k
i + νi
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j [(λ
k
i − λkj )− (λ˜ki − λ˜kj )]
λk+1i = λ˜
k
i + σiAi(x˜
k
i − xki )
− σi
∑
j∈Nλi
wi,j [(z
k
i − zkj )− (z˜ki − z˜kj )]
+ σi
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j [(λi,k − λkj )− (λ˜ki − λ˜kj )]
19
To obtain the FBF and EG algorithms, let us rewrite the operator B¯ in
(17) as B¯ = C + D, where C contains the local constraints and D is the skew
symmetric matrix. Let us also call H = A¯ + D. Then, in compact form, the
FBF algorithm generates two sequences (uk,vk)k≥0 as follows:
uk = JΨ−1C(v
k −Ψ−1Hvk)
vk+1 = uk +Ψ−1(Hvk −Huk). (32)
In (32), Ψ is a block-diagonal matrix that contains the step sizes:
Ψ = diag(α−1, ν−1, σ−1), (33)
where α, ν and σ are diagonal matrices of suitable dimensions. Convergence of
the stochastic FBF with the SAA scheme is guaranteed by [26, Theorem 4.5].
Analogously, we can write the stochastic distributed EG algorithm in com-
pact form as:
uk = JΨ−1C(v
k −Ψ−1Hvk)
vk+1 = JΨ−1C(v
k −Ψ−1Huk). (34)
In this case, convergence is guaranteed by [27, Theorem 3.18] with the SAA
scheme.
8.2 Case study: Network Cournot game
Now, we consider the electricity market problem as proposed in [20]. Such
problem can also be casted as a network Cournot game with markets capacity
constraints [5, 25].
We consider a set of N generators (companies) that sell energy in a set of m
locations (markets). The random variable ξ represent the demand uncertainty.
Each generator decides the quantity xi of energy to deliver in the ni markets it
is connected with. Each company has a local cost function ci(xi) related to the
production of electricity. The cost function is not uncertain as we suppose that
the companies are able to compute their own cost of production.
Each market has a bounded capacity bj therefore the collective constraints are
given by Ax ≤ b where A = [A1, . . . , AN ]. Each Ai specifies in which market a
company i participates. The prices of the locations are collected in P : Rm×Ξ→
Rm. The uncertainty variable appears in this functional which is related to the
demand. P is supposed to be a linear function. The cost function of each agent
is then given by
Ji(xi, x−i, ξ) = ci(xi)− E[P (ξ)⊤(Ax)Aixi].
Clearly, if ci(xi) is strongly convex with Lipschitz continuous gradient and the
prices are linear, the pseudo gradient of Ji is strongly monotone.
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Algorithm 5 Distributed Extragradient
Initialization: x0i ∈ Ωi, λ0i ∈ Rm≥0, and z0i ∈ Rm.
Iteration k: Agent i
(1) Receives xkj for j ∈ N Ji , λkj and zj,k for j ∈ N λi then updates
x˜ki = proxgi [x
k
i − αi(Fˆi(xki ,xk−i, ξki ) +A⊤i λki )]
z˜ki = z
k
i − νi
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j(λ
k
i − λkj )
λ˜ki = projRm
≥0
{λki + σi(Aixki − bi)
+ σi
∑
j∈Nλ
i
wi,j [(z
k
i − zkj )− (λki − λkj )]}
(2) Receives x˜kj for j ∈ N Ji , λ˜kj and z˜j,k for j ∈ N λi then updates
xk+1i = proxgi [x
k
i − αi(Fˆi(x˜ki , x˜k−i, ξki ) +A⊤i λ˜ki )]
zk+1i = z
k
i − νi
∑
j∈N λ˜
i
wi,j(λ˜
k
i − λ˜kj )
λk+1i = projRm≥0
{λki + σi(Aix˜ki − bi)
+ σi
∑
j∈N λ˜
i
wi,j [(z˜
k
i − z˜kj )− (λ˜ki − λ˜kj )]}
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8.3 Simulations
As a numerical setting, we consider a set of 20 companies and 7 markets, simi-
larly to [5, 25]. Each company i has a local constraint of the form 0 < xi < γi
where each component of γi is randomly drawn from [1, 1.5]. In terms of elec-
tricity market, this can be seen as the capacity limit of generator i. Each market
j has a maximal capacity bj randomly drawn from [0.5, 1]. The local cost func-
tion of the generator i is ci(xi) = πi
∑ni
j=1([xi]j)
2 + q⊤i xi, where [xi]j indicates
the j component of xi. πi is randomly drawn from [1, 8], and each component
of qi is randomly drawn from [0.1, 0.6]. Notice that ci(xi) is strongly convex
with Lipschitz continuous gradient. Recall that the cost function of agent i is
influenced by the variables of the companies selling in the same market. This
information can be retrieved from the graph in [5, Fig. 1].
The price P (ξ) = P¯ −D(ξ)Ax is taken as a linear function and each com-
ponent of P¯ = col(P¯1, . . . , P¯7) is randomly drawn from [2, 4]. The uncertainty
appears in the quantities D(ξ) = diag{d1(ξ1), . . . , d7(ξ7)} that concern the total
supply for each market. The entries of D(ξ) are taken with a normal distri-
bution with mean 0.8 and finite variance. Following [5], we suppose that the
dual variables graph is a cycle graph with the addiction of the edges (2, 15) and
(6, 13).
We simulate Algorithm 2, 4 and 5 to make a comparison using the SAA
scheme. The parameters α, ν and σ are taken to be the highest possible to
obtain convergence. The plots in Fig. 1 and 2 show respectively ‖xk+1−x
∗‖
‖x∗‖ and
‖L⊗ I7 λk‖. The first performance index indicates the convergence to a solution
x∗, while the second shows convergence of the dual variables to consensus. The
plot in Fig. 3 shows the computational time needed to reach a solution. As one
can see from Fig. 1 and 2, our algorithm is comparable, in terms of number of
iterations, to the FBF algorithm but it is computationally the least expensive
(Fig. 3).
Concerning the SA scheme, our numerical experience suggests that a solution
may be reached but very slowly. Indeed, taking the same number of iterations as
in Fig. 1, we obtain a relative distance from the solution of order 10−1 (higher
that the SAA scheme). The advantage of the SA scheme is though that it is
computationally not expensive.
9 Conclusion
The preconditioned forward–backward operator splitting is applicable to stochas-
tic (generalized) Nash equilibrium problems to design distributed equilibrium
seeking algorithms. Since the exact expected value is hard to compute in gen-
eral, stochastic approximation or sample average approximation techniques can
be used to ensure convergence almost surely.
Convergence holds under restricted cocoercivity of the pseudo gradient for
stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problems and under restricted strict
monotonicity for stochastic Nash equilibrium problems. These assumption are
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Figure 1: Relative distance of the primal variable from the solution.
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Figure 2: Disagreement between the dual variables.
among the weakest known in literature and, remarkably, match well with the
deterministic setup.
10 Appendix A
Proofs of Section 4.2
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof of (i) follows similarly to [5, Theorem 2].
Concerning (ii), given Standing Assumpitons 1–3, the game in (9) has at least
one solution x∗, therefore, there exists a λ∗ ∈ Rm≥0 such that the KKT conditions
in (14) are satisfied [35, Theorem 3.1]. It follows that zer(A + B) 6= ∅. The
existence of z∗ such that col(x∗, z∗,λ∗) ∈ zer(A¯+ B¯) follows from properties of
the normal cone and of the Laplacian matrix as a consequence of Assumption
5 [5, Theorem 2].
Proof of Lemma 2. First we notice that ‖L‖ ≥ 2d∗ and that by the Baillon-
Haddard Theorem the Laplacian operator is 12d∗ -cocoercive. Then Statement
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Figure 3: Computation time (performed on Matlab R2019a with a 2,3 GHz Intel
Core i5 and 8 GB LPDDR3 RAM).
(i) follows by this computation:
〈A(ω1)−A(ω2),ω1 − ω2〉
= 〈F(x1)− F(x2), x1 − x2〉+ 〈Lλ1 −Lλ2,λ1 − λ2〉
≥ β ‖F(x1)− F(x2)‖2 + 1
2d∗
‖Lλ1 −Lλ2‖2
≥ min
{
β,
1
2d∗
}(
‖F(x1)− F(x2)‖2 + ‖Lλ1 −Lλ2‖2
)
≥ θ ‖A(ω1)−A(ω2)‖2 .
The operator B¯ is given by a sum, therefore it is maximally monotone if both
the addend are [16, Proposition 20.23]. The first part is maximally monotone
by Standing Assumption 1 and Moreau Theorem [16, Theorem 20.25] and the
second part is a skew symmetric matrix [16, Corollary 20.28]. Statement (iii)
follows from Statement (i) and (iv) follows from (ii) [5, Lemma 7].
11 Appendix B
Sequence of random variables
In this appendix we recall some results on sequences of random variables, given
the probability space (Ξ,F ,P).
Let us define the filtration F = {Fk}, that is, a family of σ-algebras such
that F0 = σ (X0), for all k ≥ 1, Fk = σ (X0, ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξk) and Fk ⊆ Fk+1 for
all k ≥ 0.
The Robbins-Siegmund Lemma is widely used in literature to prove a.s.
convergence of sequences of random variables. It first appeared in [41].
Lemma 3 (Robbins-Siegmund Lemma, [41]). Let F = (Fk)k∈N be a filtration.
Let {αk}k∈N, {θk}k∈N, {ηk}k∈N and {χk}k∈N be non negative sequences such
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that
∑
k ηk <∞,
∑
k χk <∞ and let
∀k ∈ N, E[αk+1|Fk] + θk ≤ (1 + χk)αk + ηk a.s.
Then
∑
k θk < ∞ and {αk}k∈N converges a.s. to a non negative random vari-
able.
We also need this result for Lp norms, known as Burkholder-Davis-Gundy
inequality [42].
Lemma 4 (Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality). Let {Fk} be a filtration and
{Uk}k≥0 a vector-valued martingale relative to this filtration. Then, for all
p ∈ [1,∞), there exists a universal constant cp > 0 such that for every k ≥ 1
E
[(
sup
0≤i≤N
‖Ui‖
)p] 1p
≤ cpE

( N∑
i=1
‖Ui − Ui−1‖2
) p
2


1
p
.
We also recall the Minkowski inequality: for given functions f, g ∈ Lp(Ξ,F ,P),
G ⊆ F and p ∈ [0;∞]
E [‖f + g‖p |G] 1p ≤ E [‖f‖p |G] 1p + E [‖g‖p |G] 1p .
When combined with the Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality, it leads to the
fact that for all p ≥ 2, there exists a constant cp > 0 such that, for every k ≥ 1,
E
[(
sup
0≤i≤N
‖Ui‖
)p] 1p
≤ cp
√√√√ N∑
k=1
E (‖Ui − Ui−1‖p)
2
p .
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Proofs of Theorem 1
In this section, we prove convergence of Algorithm 2.
First we note that the iterations of Algorithm 2 are obtained by expanding
(20) and solving for xk, zk and λk. Therefore, convergence of the sequence
(xk,λk) to a v-GNE of the game in (9) follows by the convergence of the FB
iterations in (20).
We now prove a preliminary result concerning the sequence generated by
Algorithm 2.
Lemma 5. Let Assumption 2, 6 hold. Then, the sequence generated by (20)
satisfy, for some ζ > 1
E
[∥∥ωk+1 − ω∗∥∥2
Φ
|Fk
]
≤ ∥∥ωk − ω∗∥∥2
Φ
+
+ 2E
[∥∥Φ−1εk∥∥2Φ |Fk
]
+
1
2
(
1
ζ
− 1
)
resΦ(ω
k)2.
(35)
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Proof. We start by using nonexpansiviveness of the resolvent:∥∥ωk+1 − ω∗∥∥2
Φ
≤ ∥∥ωk − ω∗∥∥2
Φ
+ 2〈ωk − ω∗,Φ−1εk〉Φ
− 2〈ωk − ω∗,Φ−1(A¯(ωk)− A¯(ω∗))〉Φ+
− ∥∥ωk − ωk+1∥∥2
Φ
+ 2〈ωk − ωk+1,Φ−1(Aˆ(ωk)− A¯(ω∗))〉Φ
By Young’s inequality with ζ > 1, we have that
2〈ωk − ωk+1,Φ−1(Aˆ(ωk)− A¯(ωk+1))〉Φ ≤ 1
ζ
∥∥ωk − ω∗∥∥2
Φ
+
+ ζ
∥∥Φ−1(A¯(ωk)− A¯(ω∗))∥∥2
Φ
+ ζ
∥∥Φ−1εk∥∥2Φ+
+ 2ζ〈Φ−1A¯(ωk)− Φ−1A¯(ω∗), εk〉Φ
(36)
Then, by using cocoercivity of F and including (36), we obtain:∥∥ωk+1 − ω∗∥∥2
Φ
≤ ∥∥ωk − ω∗∥∥2
Φ
+ ζ
∥∥Φ−1εk∥∥2
Φ
+
+
(
1
ζ
− 1
)∥∥ωk − ωk+1∥∥2
Φ
+ 2〈ωk − ω∗,Φ−1εk〉Φ+
+
(
ζ
∥∥Φ−1∥∥
θ
− 2
)
〈ωk − ω∗,Φ−1A¯(ωk)− Φ−1A¯(ω∗)〉Φ
+ 2ζ〈Φ−1A¯(ωk)− Φ−1A¯(ω∗), εk〉Φ
(37)
Next, given the residual res(ωk), we have that
resΦ(ω
k)2 =
∥∥ωk − (Id+Φ−1B)−1(ωk − Φ−1A¯(ωk))∥∥2
Φ
≤2 ∥∥ωk − ωk+1∥∥2
Φ
+ 2
∥∥∥(Id+Φ−1B)−1(ωk − Φ−1Aˆ(ωk, ξk))+
−(Id+Φ−1B)−1(ωk − Φ−1A¯(ωk))∥∥2
Φ
≤2 ∥∥ωk − ωk+1∥∥2
Φ
+ 2
∥∥Φ−1εk∥∥2
Φ
(38)
where the first equality follows by the definition of ωk+1 and the last inequality
follows from non expansivity. Then,∥∥ωk − ωk+1∥∥2
Φ
≥ 1
2
resΦ(ω
k)2 − ∥∥Φ−1εk∥∥2
Φ
Finally, equation (39) becomes
∥∥ωk+1 − ω∗∥∥2
Φ
≤ ∥∥ωk − ω∗∥∥2
Φ
+
(
ζ − 1
ζ
+ 1
)∥∥Φ−1εk∥∥2
Φ
+
+ 2〈ωk − ω∗,Φ−1εk〉Φ + 1
2
(
1
ζ
− 1
)
resΦ(ω
k)2
+
(
ζ
∥∥Φ−1∥∥
θ
− 2
)
〈ωk − ω∗,Φ−1A¯(ωk)− Φ−1A¯(ω∗)〉Φ
+ 2ζ〈Φ−1A¯(ωk)− Φ−1A¯(ω∗), εk〉Φ
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By taking the expected value and by using Assumption 6 and 2, we obtain
(35).
Before proving convergence of the algorithm with the SAA scheme, we prove
a preliminary result on the variance of the stochastic error.
Lemma 6. For all k ≥ 0, if Assumption 4 hold, we have that a.s.
E
[
‖ǫk‖2 |Fk
]
≤ cσ
2
Sk
.
Proof. We first prove that
E
[
‖ǫk‖2 |Fk
] 1
2 ≤ c2σ√
Sk
then the claim follows immediately. Define the process {MSS (x)}Si=0 asM0(x) =
0 and for 1 ≤ i ≤ S
MSi (x) =
1
S
i∑
j=1
FSAA(x, ξj)− F(x).
Let Fi = σ(ξ1, . . . , ξi). Then {MSi (x),Fi}Si=1 is a martingale starting at 0. Let
∆MSi−1(x) =M
S
i (x)−MSi−1(x)
= FSAA(x, ξi)− F(x).
Then, by Equation (25), we have
E
[∥∥∆MSi−1∥∥2] 12 = 1SE
[
‖FSAA(x, ξi)− F(x)‖2
] 1
2 ≤ σ
S
.
By applying Lemma 4, we have
E
[∥∥MSS (x)∥∥2] 12 ≤ c2
√√√√ N∑
i=1
E
[∥∥∥∥FSAA(x, ξi)− F(x)S
∥∥∥∥
2
]
≤ c2
√√√√ 1
S2
N∑
i=1
E
[
‖FSAA(x, ξi)− F(x)‖2
]
≤ c2σ√
S
.
We note that MSS (x
k) = ǫk, hence by taking the square we conclude that
E
[
‖ǫk‖2 |Fk
]
≤ cσ
2
Sk
.
27
We note that if Lemma 6 holds, then it follows that
E
[∥∥Φ−1εk∥∥2Φ |Fk
]
≤ cσ
2
∥∥Φ−1∥∥
Sk
.
We are now ready to prove the main convergence result.
Proof of Theorem 1. By Lemma 5 and 6 we have that
E
[∥∥ωk+1 − ω∗∥∥2
Φ
|Fk
]
≤∥∥ωk − ω∗∥∥2
Φ
+ 2
cσ2
∥∥Φ−1∥∥
Sk
+
1
2
(
1
ζ
− 1
)
res(ωk)2.
Using Lemma 3 we conclude that {ωk} is bounded and has a cluster point ω¯.
Since
∑
θk < 0, res(ω
k)→ 0 as k →∞ and res(ω¯) = 0.
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Proofs of Theorem 2
Proof of Theorem 2. We start by using nonexpansiveness of the projection:∥∥xk+1 − x∗∥∥2 ≤∥∥xk − x∗∥∥2 + γ2 ‖ǫk‖2+
+ 2γk〈xk − x∗, ǫk〉 −
∥∥xk − xk+1∥∥2
− 2γk〈xk − x∗, F (xk)− F (x∗)〉+
+ 2γk〈xk − xk+1, Fˆ (xk)− F (x∗)〉
By using cocoercivity of F and the Young’s inequality as in (36) we derive the
following upper bound:∥∥xk+1 − x∗∥∥2 ≤ ∥∥xk − x∗∥∥2 + ζγ2k ‖ǫk‖2
+
(
1
ζ
− 1
)∥∥xk − xk+1∥∥2 + 2γk〈xk − x∗, ǫk〉
+
(
ζγ2k
β
− 2γk
)
〈xk − x∗, F (xk)− F (x∗)〉
− 2ζγ2k〈F (xk)− F (x∗), ǫk〉
(39)
Let the residual be res(xk) =
∥∥xk − proj(xk − F (xk))∥∥, then
res(xk)2 ≤ 2 ∥∥xk − xk+1∥∥2+
+ 2
∥∥∥proj(xk − γkFˆ (xk, ξk))− proj(xk − γkF (xk))∥∥∥2
≤ 2 ∥∥xk − xk+1∥∥2 + 2 ∥∥∥γkFˆ (xk, ξk))− γkF (xk)∥∥∥2
= 2
∥∥xk − xk+1∥∥2 + 2γ2k ‖ǫk‖2
(40)
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where the first equality follow by the definition of xk+1 and the last inequality
follows from non expansivity of the projection. Then,
∥∥xk − xk+1∥∥2 ≥ 1
2
res(xk)2 − γ2k ‖ǫk‖2
and equation (39) becomes
∥∥xk+1 − x∗∥∥2 ≤ ∥∥xk − x∗∥∥2 + (ζ − 1
ζ
+ 1
)
γ2k ‖ǫk‖2+
+
1
2
(
1
ζ
− 1
)
res(xk)2 + 2γk〈xk − x∗, ǫk〉+
+
(
ζγ2k
β
− 2γk
)
〈xk − x∗, F (xk)− F (x∗)〉+
+ 2ζγ2k〈F (xk)− F (x∗), ǫk〉
By taking the expected value we have that
E
[∥∥xk+1 − x∗∥∥2 |Fk] ≤ ∥∥xk − x∗∥∥2+
+
(
ζ − 1
ζ
+ 1
)
γ2kE
[
‖ǫk‖2 |Fk
]
+
1
2
(
1
ζ
− 1
)
res(xk)2.
Finally, we apply Lemma 3 to conclude that (xk)k∈N is bounded, therefore it
has at least one cluster point x¯. Since − 12 res(xk)2 < 0, by Lemma 3 we have
that res(xk) → 0 as k → 0. This implies that res(x¯) = 0 that is, x¯ is a SGNE
of the game in (9).
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